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Abstract
The “conservative central banker” has come under attack recently. Explicitly
modeling the interaction of a trade union with monetary policy, it has been
argued that the standard solution to the inflationary bias in monetary policy
might actually be welfare reducing if the trade union has an exogenously given
preference against inflation. We reframe this discussion in a standard trade
union model. We show that the case against the conservative central banker
rests exclusively on the assumption of a strictly nominal outside option (for
instance, unemployment benefits) for the union. There is no welfare gain
associated with making the central bank less conservative than society,
however if the outside option is in real terms. As the nominal components of the
trade union’s outside option are mainly public transfers, we also show that the
conservative central banker is always optimal if the government can choose the
level of unemployment benefits as well as the degree of central bank
conservatism.
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1. Introduction
The “conservative central banker” has come under attack lately. In an important paper, Rogoff
(1985) had suggested reducing the inflationary bias of monetary policy by delegating
monetary policy to an independent and conservative central bank which cares less about
unemployment than the government does. Changing the preferences would reduce the
expected rate of inflation and thus the factual rate. While other solutions to this problem have
been suggested (see, among others, Lohmann 1992, Walsh 1995), the conservative central
banker remains perhaps the most popular point of reference regarding institutional remedies
against inflation suggested by economists. And indeed, a numerous and still growing
empirical literature often finds a negative relationship between central bank independence and
inflation across countries and time (for surveys, see e.g. Eijffinger and de Haan 1996, Berger
et al. 2000).
Recently, however, a series of papers has questioned the theoretical foundation of the
conservative central banker solution. One strand links labor market reform with monetary
policy. The basic argument is that while such labor market reforms might be politically costly,
they will help to lower the inflationary bias (e.g. Calmfors 1998). A second strand tries to
endogenize the inflation bias by allowing for direct interaction of non-atomistic trade unions
and monetary policy (Cubitt 1992, Grüner and Hefeker 1999, Cukierman and Lippi 1999,
Guzzo and Velasco 1999, Lawler 2000). The argument builds on a non-atomistic trade union
model of the labor market, where nominal wage setters take into account the reaction of the
central bank to the implied real wage. What sets these models apart from the standard labor
market literature is that they assume that trade unions are “inflation averse”, i.e. that their
target functions include not only some real wage and employment target but also costs of
inflation. The assumption is often justified by non-indexed nominal components in a trade
union’s outside option.
The effect of this change can be quite dramatic: because trade unions dislike inflation,
they moderate their wage claims to limit the central bank’s incentives for an inflationary
policy. This has two important consequences for the traditional monetary policy model. First,
the behavior of inflation-averse trade unions establishes a direct link between central bank
characteristics and real labor market outcomes – a link that does not exist in the standard
framework. Second, a more conservative central bank will prefer tolerating the higher
unemployment rate to increasing inflation. A trade union which is inflation averse will be
more moderate, the stronger nominal wage increases raise inflation. Hence, a liberal central2
bank rather than a conservative central bank will induce trade unions to moderate wages. In
fact, there even seems to be a case for an “ultra-liberal” or “populist central banker” (see
Guzzo and Velasco 1999, Cukierman and Lippi 1999, Lippi 1999a, and Berger et al. 2000 for
a survey).
The case against the conservative central banker is clearly the strongest in a single
trade union model. Obviously, a very small or atomistic trade union will disregard any effect
wages have on inflation. Also, as stressed by Lippi (1999b) and Coricelli, Cukierman and
Dalmazzo (2000), in the intermediate case of multiple but large trade unions, the effect of
inflation on the relative real wage set by a trade union might produce a “competition effect”
that qualifies the case for a liberal central banker. An increase in the nominal wage – ceteris
paribus – implies a higher real wage for all trade unions in the economy and thus increases the
outside option for the particular trade union. Given the other trade unions’ nominal wage
rates, the trade union will demand higher nominal wages which, in turn, will lead to a lower
level of production and labor demand in the overall economy from the perspective of the
individual union. The moderating effect of this mechanism will be larger, the more
conservative the central bank is.
1
It would seem, however, that the argument against the conservative central banker is
still very much alive in the “special case” of a monopoly trade union setting, where such
moderating effects are absent. Clearly, the result here hinges on the “unusual assumption”
(Soskice and Iversen 2000, fn. 3) of inflation aversion on the trade union’s side.
2 Most of the
literature so far relies on an exogenous or ad-hoc specification of the trade union’s target
function that simply assumes that trade union utility is decreasing in deviations of inflation
from a target level of zero. Such a specification is clearly at odds with more standard models
of trade union behavior (compare Oswald 1982). Therefore, the question arises as to how the
inflation aversion of a monopoly trade union could come about?
Probably the most natural way to model the dislike of inflation is by introducing
nominal income components in a standard trade union optimization problem. To follow up on
                                                
1 Another moderating effect of central bank conservatism is discussed in  Soskice and  Iversen (2000) and
Coricelli,  Cukierman and  Dalmazzo (2000). In their monopolistic competition frameworks, a conservative
central bank will run a less accommodative policy when unions raise nominal wages and, consequently, firms’
prices. This policy change decreases employment and induces a more cautious wage setting behavior. This
moderating effect is increasing in central bank conservatism.  Lawler (2000), in addition, shows that in a
stochastic environment central banks should not be ultra-liberal because they would produce excessively high
inflation variance.
2 Note that this assumption is needed for making the case for the liberal central banker. The real non-neutrality
of monetary policy as such does not depend on the trade union’s aversion to inflation (Lippi 1999b, Soskice and3
this notion, we will contrast the behavior of a trade union with an outside option defined in
real terms with the behavior of a trade union with a nominal outside option. Building on a
simple model (presented in Section 2) of the goods and labor market with decreasing returns
to scale in which the price level is controlled by the central bank, we discuss how inflation
aversion affects trade unions by looking at two benchmark cases in Section 3. In Section 4 we
then show that the conservative-central-banker result is socially optimal when the outside
option is defined in real terms. The opposite might be true, however, when the trade union’s
outside option, for instance the unemployment benefit payments, is defined in nominal terms.
In this case, the trade union will enforce a higher real wage if the real outside option faced by
its members improves due to a more conservative monetary policy. Section 5 generalizes
these results and discusses the extent to which the latter result is a consequence of restricting
the government’s set of policy instruments. We show that the Rogoff solution always prevails
if the government can choose the level of unemployment benefits as well as the degree of
central bank conservatism and there is a minimum real living standard. Section 6 concludes.
2. Model
The model considers four stages. In the first stage the government chooses the degree of
conservatism c of the central bank, i.e. the weight the central bank gives to inflation relative
to unemployment in its objective function. In Section 5 we will, in addition, allow the
government to choose unemployment benefits. In the second stage we assume a single
monopolistic trade union in the economy which maximizes the income of its members by
fixing the wage rate w.
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Iversen 2000). For earlier literature that derived the non-neutrality result from the interaction of monopoly trade
unions with fiscal and monetary policy regimes, see Driffill (1985) or Jensen (1993).4
The focus on a single trade union allows us to identify the assumptions underlying the
unambiguous result that a benevolent government should choose an “ultra-liberal” central
bank. Given the nominal wage rate and the predetermined degree of conservatism in the third
stage, the central bank then chooses the price level and therefore the inflation rate. In the
fourth and final stage profit-maximizing firms determine output levels and employment
levels. The sequencing is illustrated in Figure 1. The model is solved backwards.
Stage 4: Firms
In stage 4, profit-maximizing firms decide upon output and employment levels. To keep the
model as simple as possible, we focus on the strongest case in favor of an “ultra-liberal”
central bank which is the case of centralized wage setting. Therefore, the economy comprises
one sector only in which firms produce a consumer good Y with a Cobb-Douglas technology
a = AN Y ,
with  0 > A  and  1 0 < a <  being parameters of production and N denoting labor demand. It is
convenient to express  N as a percentage of the total labor supply  M. So employment is
M N n / = , with  ( ) 1 , 0 n˛ .












d a = ) ( A d  and  ) 1 ( 1 a - = d > 1. Unemployment is  n u - =1 . Note that a real wage of
( )
d =
/ 1 * d p w  would ensure full employment (or zero unemployment) in the economy.
Output prices and the nominal wage rate are determined by the central bank and the
trade union, respectively. To see the impact their decisions have on employment, note that
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We use sub-indices to indicate partial derivatives.5
Stage 3: Central bank
In stage 3 the central bank determines the price level, taking into account the nominal wage
set by the trade union in stage 2. The central bank’s loss function has the standard quadratic
form
2 2 5 . 0 5 . 0 p ￿ + ￿ = c u L ,
where p is the rate of inflation and  0 > c  is the weight attached to the inflation target. The
parameter c measures the bank’s degree of conservatism. The central bank aims at minimizing
deviations of average unemployment and inflation from their target levels set to zero in both
cases. It is convenient to rewrite  1 1 / ) ( - - - = p t t t p p p . Normalizing  1 1 ” - t p  and dropping the
time index this alters the appearance of the loss function to
(3) ( )
2 2 1 5 . 0 5 . 0 - ￿ + ￿ = p c u L .
The central bank, which has complete control over the output price level, will set p (and thus
inflation) to minimize (3). It takes into account the labor demand behavior of firms, but it will
take nominal wages set by the trade unions in stage 2 as given. That is, the central bank acts
as Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis firms, but is pricetaker (Stackelberg follower) vis-à-vis trade
unions. Taking the derivative of (3) with respect to p yields the following first order condition
(4) ( ) ( ) 0 1 1 = - + -
d
- = p c n n
p
Lp .
The central bank will set p in such a way that the marginal benefit of a higher price level (first
term) equals marginal cost (last term). While the latter is strictly increasing in p, the marginal
benefit, however, is hump-shaped in p with a maximum at  2 / 1 = n . The reason is that a
higher price level changes both the weight attached to a further change in the unemployment
level and the impact a change in the price level has on unemployment. The first effect is due
to the quadratic nature of the loss function, while the second effect stems from the decreasing
marginal returns of the Cobb-Douglas technology. While both effects decline in p and (via
(1)) n, the concavity of the production function ensures that the hump-shape disappears for
average employment levels larger than  ( ) ( ) 1 2 / 1 - d - d > n . This condition is always fulfilled
if average employment n > 1/2. We will realistically assume that the employment level is
beyond that threshold in what follows. Also note that the central bank will choose p > 1 if
there is positive unemployment, n < 1, but p = 1 when n = 1. For 0 < n < 1 we have
(5a) 0 ) 1 2 ( ) 1 2 (
2
> - + -
d
= p c n n
p
Lpp6
(5b) 0 ) 1 ( > - = p p Lpc
and
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Lpw .
Thus comparative statics yield






i.e. the price level will be lower the more conservative the central bank is (for all  1 > p ). With
respect to the nominal wage, we obtain






i.e. the price level increases in the nominal wage.
A convenient way to summarize the behavior of the central bank as described in
equation (4) is to look at the nominal wage elasticity of the price level. Differentiating the
first-order condition of the central bank with regard to w and p and rearranging yields
(8)  ( )
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The wage elasticity of the price level is less than unity if the central bank cares about inflation
because, in this case, it is not willing to accommodate a nominal wage increase completely.
Instead, it is willing to accept some unemployment in order to keep the inflation rate low.
This follows directly from the concavity of the utility function.
Stage 2: Trade union
In stage 2 the trade union is fixing the nominal wage rate to maximize a (utilitarian) welfare
function incorporating the disposable real income of employed and unemployed members
















real b  can be interpreted as real unemployment benefits or real opportunity costs
of labor supply. An example for the latter would be the real income in the shadow economy
forgone by entering the labor market. More importantly, Blanchard and Katz (1999) argue
that at least part of public unemployment benefits might be defined in real terms, too. To the
extent that unemployment benefits are instead fixed in nominal terms, they are covered by the
term 
nom b . Other than the distinction between nominal and real outside options the model is7
quite standard in the labor market literature (see Oswald 1982). Note that we abstain, for
instance, from the introduction of nominal wealth in the trade union’s target function. One
reason is that the economic consequences of nominal wealth and a nominal outside option
supplied through, say, a public unemployment benefit scheme are similar. Moreover, the role
publicly provided nominal unemployment schemes play in the trade union’s decision will
probably dominate possible nominal wealth effects.
3 On a more fundamental note, one could
add that, in a model based on rational choice, the very existence of nominal, non-indexed
wealth would have to be justified either by non-rational behavior or an incomplete markets
argument.
4
The trade union maximizes (9) taking unemployment benefits and the degree of
conservatism as given. However, the trade union takes into account the reaction of the central
bank and, by extension, of labor demand of the firms, when setting its nominal wage rate w.
Hence, in line with the standard literature, the trade union is acting as Stackelberg leader vis-
à-vis the central bank and the firms.
Stage 1: Government
In stage 1 the government determines the degree of conservatism c and (see Section 5) the
unemployment benefits b. Conceptually, the existence of stage 1 allows us to consider the
effects of variations in c or b on the equilibrium of the model. We do not explicitly consider
the objective function of the government at this point, but will return to the government’s
decision below.
Solving for the equilibrium
In order to describe the equilibrium where both the trade union and the central bank has made
their optimal decisions given the degree of conservatism c, we need to take explicit account of
the first-order conditions of both the central bank and the trade union. Using the partial















                                                
3 This might be the case because the stock of wealth is too low to matter for many trade union members or
because state-supplied nominal benefits are means tested, making possibly existing private assets de facto a part
of the public support scheme.
4 A trade union consisting of members capable of calculating the optimal wage setting policy – including the
inflation implied by any nominal wage rate set – in a multi-stage, multi-actor model is difficult to bring in line
with the existence of non-indexed wealth. After all, a rational trade union member will not invest in, say, a
nominal government bond without taking into account expected inflation.8
which combines the second-order conditions for central bank and trade union. Using the signs
of the partial derivatives in (10), as derived before, we find that the system has a positive
determinant  0 > - = ww ppV L D . Applying Cramer’s Rule, we get
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The result implies that the equilibrium price change due to an increase in the degree of the
central bank’s conservatism, dp/dc, is the result of two – possibly opposing – effects. On the
one hand, there is the direct effect on central bank behavior induced by the changed weights
in its loss function. This unambiguously tends to lower the price level, i.e. pc < 0. On the other
hand, there is the implied change in the wage rate, wc, and its indirect effect on the central
bank’s price setting. From the optimal reaction of the central bank we know that higher wages
are unambiguously translated into higher prices, i.e. that pw > 0. However, the change in the
nominal wage rate depends on trade union behavior and might go either way. If the trade
union decreases the nominal wage when the central bank becomes more conservative, wc < 0,
it follows that the observed equilibrium price level is decreasing as well:  dp/dc < 0. By
contrast, if the trade union increases the nominal wage when the central bank becomes more
conservative, wc > 0, the overall price decrease becomes smaller or might even turn into an
equilibrium price increase. To summarize
PROPOSITION 1 (inflation): An increase in the central bank’s conservatism
decreases the equilibrium price level (or inflation) if and only if the direct effect
on the central bank’s price-setting behavior is not overcompensated by the
incentive to respond to trade union behavior, i.e. iff  c w c p p w - < .
But how will the trade union react to a variation in the central bank’s conservatism? The

































As the trade union is a Stackelberg leader with respect to the central bank, the equilibrium
effect is equal to the partial derivative  c w , which cannot be signed a priori. We will return to
this below. The employment effect has the opposite sign of the real wage effect, i.e.  0 < p w n .



























Note that wc > 0 is a sufficient condition for the equilibrium real wage to increase in c, too. It
is therefore necessary to determine the conditions under which this effect becomes positive
and the conditions under which the reverse occurs.
3. The role of the trade union’s outside option
In this section we discuss two benchmark cases to illuminate the role of the trade union’s
outside option in the model. First, we consider a trade union which faces a pure real outside
option. Then, we analyze the case of a trade union whose outside option is determined in
nominal terms only so that the outside option is negatively affected by a price increase.
Real outside option for the trade union
Let us start with the case where there is no nominal element in the outside option ( 0 =
nom b ).





n V - + = 1 .
The first-order condition is
(15) ( ) [ ] ( ) 0 1 0 1
) 1 (








where we used the fact that the wage elasticity of labor demand is  d - = n w nw / . A nominal
wage that maximizes the objective function of the trade union monopoly exists iff the second
derivative is negative at  0 = w V . This is always true for the case of a real outside option, i.e.
( ) 0 1 < d + - d - =
real
w ww b p V .
5
The first-order condition does not depend on q, i.e. the nominal wage elasticity of the
price level. The change in the nominal wage with respect to a change in the degree of
conservatism is given by
                                                
5 To see this, substitute for n from the first order condition (15) and rearrange to find  w p b V
real
ww / ) 1 ( d q - - = .10
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From the discussion of equation (11) above we already know that  wc < 0 is a sufficient
condition for equilibrium inflation to decrease in c: dp/dc < 0. Substituting (16) in (14) also




















As the trade union has complete control over the real wage, it will set the real wage equal to
the real unemployment benefit payments times a mark up, independently of the price level.
Hence, the degree of conservatism does not affect the real wage nor employment.
PROPOSITION 2 (real outside option): If the outside option of the monopoly
trade union is defined in real terms only, the real wage and employment are
independent of the degree of central bank conservatism. The price level is
decreasing in the degree of central bank conservatism.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. If the trade union does not care about
nominal values (and in the absence of uncertainty or shocks), it can always enforce its
preferred real wage. Since a variation in nominal values such as the price level does not affect
the trade union’s outside option, the trade union will change the nominal wage in response to
changes in c only in order to keep the optimal real wage constant.
Nominal outside option for the trade union
Now let us turn to the case where the unemployment benefit payments are nominally fixed
only ( 0 =
real b ). Obviously, the trade union is now inflation averse as a higher price level










- + = 1 ,
and the first-order condition is:11
( )( ) ( ) 0
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Assuming that the second-order condition is negative, i.e.  0 < ww V , the sign of  c w  is given by
the sign of  wc V . As is shown in Appendix 1, the partial derivative of the first-order condition
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As  0 < c p ,  1 > p  and  2 / 1 > n  the sign is unambiguously positive. Hence we have
(19) 0 > c w .
A more conservative central bank reduces the negative effect that higher nominal wages have
on the outside option and thus makes the trade union more demanding. What does this imply
for inflation? From Proposition 1 we already know that the change in p is ambiguous when
the change in the nominal wage implied by a higher degree of central bank conservatism is
positive, i.e. if  0 > c w . Although we cannot sign the change in the price level, we can sign the















Summing up we can state:
PROPOSITION 3 (nominal outside option): If the outside option of the mono-
poly trade union is defined in nominal terms only, the nominal wage and the real
wage are both increasing and employment is decreasing in the degree of central
bank conservatism. The price level might be either decreasing or increasing in
central bank conservatism.
In Appendix 2 we show that this result can be generalized to the case where the trade union
has to consider both a real and a nominal outside option. In this case the nominal wage may
increase or decrease depending on the relative weights of the nominal and the real outside
option. However, the real wage is always increasing as soon as there is a nominal outside
option  0 >
nom b  for the trade union to consider.12
4. The government decision
So far the discussion of the role of government has been limited to comparative  statics
concerning the union’s outside option and central bank characteristics. As shown, a change in
central bank conservatism imposed by the government has different repercussions for
inflation and unemployment depending on whether the trade union’s outside option is defined
in nominal or real terms. However, the government might also have a significant influence on
the nature of the trade union’s outside option. Given this possible menu of policy tools and
policy effects, how will the government set its instruments?
A natural assumption is that the government values both price stability and
employment. Then the benchmark results discussed above have a straightforward policy
implication if the only policy option of the government is to choose the degree of central bank
conservatism. Assume that the social loss function of the government is given by a standard
quadratic loss function
(20) 
2 2 5 . 0 5 . 0 p ￿ + ￿ = g u L
gov ,
where  +¥ < < g 0  is the weight the government attaches to losses from inflation. The
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where the change in the price level and the nominal wage is determined by the equation
system (10). Substituting in the partial derivatives  ) 1 ( ) 1 (
1 - + - d - =
- p g np n L
gov
p ,
1 ) 1 (
- - d = nw n L
gov
w  and making use of the first-order condition of the central bank (4), we can












































Consider first the case of a trade union which faces a real outside option only. Substituting in






c ) 1 ( - = .
From (16) and (11) we can infer that  0 < dc dp  and hence  0 <
gov
c L . It is therefore optimal for
the government to choose an ultra-conservative central bank with  +¥ ﬁ < c g . This can be
summarized as follows:13
PROPOSITION 4a (ultra-conservative central bank): If the outside option of
the monopoly trade union is fixed in real terms only, the central bank should be
ultra-conservative, i.e. the government should set c such that  +¥ ﬁ < c g .
This confirms the well-known result that, if the trade union’s objective function is not
affected by nominal values (and in the absence of shocks or uncertainty), the government
should credibly commit itself to a non-inflationary policy to minimize the inflationary bias.
Next, consider the case where the trade union has a nominal outside option. In this
case, both the nominal and real wage increase in c, i.e.  0 > dc dw  [cf. equations (12) and
(19)] and  0 > dc p w d  [cf. equation (15b)]. By inspection of equation (22) one can infer
from the last equation that an internal solution requires  0 < dc dp . If this is the case, the first
equation shows that the optimal degree of central bank conservatism is in the interval
g c < <
* 0 . If  0 > dc dp , it is optimal to set  0
* = c . This leads to
PROPOSITION 4b (liberal central bank): If the outside option of the
monopoly trade union is fixed in nominal terms only, the central bank should be
liberal in the sense that  g c < £
* 0 . If the price level is increasing in central bank
conservatism (i.e. if  c w c p p w - < ), the central bank should be ultra-liberal, i.e. the
government should set  0
* = c .
How to interpret Propositions 4a and 4b? From the perspective of the government, setting
+¥ ﬁ < c g  if the outside option of the monopoly trade union is fixed in real terms (b
real)
follows directly from Proposition 2 and the government loss function (21). Since c has no
influence on the real economy but an increase in c unambiguously lowers inflation, making
the central bank infinitely conservative will ensure a second-best welfare optimum. It is
second best since the real wage set by the monopoly trade union is too high to allow full
employment. Things change, however, if the trade union is inflation averse. If the outside
option of the monopoly trade union is defined in nominal terms (b
nom) only, the government
best choice will always be  g c <
* . The reason is that an increase in c will now have adverse
real effects on unemployment (Proposition 3). Committing to a policy which puts less weight
on inflation will therefore be beneficial. If increasing c unambiguously increases inflation,
there is no reason anymore for a conservative central bank as both government objectives are
served best by a permissive monetary policy, i.e. by setting  0
* = c . This is the case for an
“ultra-liberal” central bank made by Cukierman and Lippi (1999) and Guzzo and Velasco
(1999). Note, however, that for the result of the “ultra-liberal” central banker to come about,
we have to deviate from the stylized fact that an increase in central bank conservatism14
empirically reduces rather than increases inflation both across time and countries (Eijffinger
and de Haan 1996, Berger et al. 2000). In other words, it is only when the reaction of prices to
central bank conservatism is not “standard” (in the sense that it is positive instead of negative)
that the conservative-central-bank-solution is turned on its head. Viewed this way, the results
in support of a “ultra-liberal” or “populist” central banker are somewhat less surprising.
5. Do we need a liberal or conservative central bank?
So far we have considered two benchmark cases, the case of a trade union which faces a real
outside option only and a trade union which faces a nominal outside option, only. As has been
pointed out at the end of Section 3, however, if the outside option of the trade union consists
of both nominally fixed and real values, the change in the nominal wage due to a change in
the degree of central bank conservatism is undetermined (compare Appendix 2). As before,
one can see from inspecting equation (22) that an internal solution requires  0 < dc dp . For





























If the nominal wage does not react to a change in the degree of central bank conservatism at
all, there is no incentive for the government to commit itself to a more conservative monetary
policy compared to its own preferences. The reason is simply that with inflation-invariant
wage setting there is no time-inconsistency problem to deal with. If instead a conservative
central bank forces the trade union to moderate the nominal wage, the government gains from
making the central bank more concerned about inflation. If the nominal outside option
dominates, however, inflation aversion may make the trade union more moderate the more
permissive monetary policy is. In this case, the government should commit to a central bank
which is more liberal than the government itself in order to exploit the trade union’s dislike of
inflation.
PROPOSITION 5 (general case): If the outside option of the monopoly trade
union consists of both nominal and real elements, the central bank should be
conservative in the sense that  g c >
*  if the nominal wage is decreasing in central
bank conservatism. It should be liberal in the sense that  g c < <
* 0  if the nominal
wage is increasing in central bank conservatism.
Whether the government should choose a conservative or liberal central bank critically hinges
on the composition of the trade union’s outside option. In particular, a liberal central bank is
only justified if a sufficiently large nominal outside option exists for the trade union. The15
question is thus, what can be said about the possible sources of an outside option in nominal
terms?
As argued earlier, it would seem that the most likely candidate for introducing a
nominal element in the outside option of the trade union is the government itself. Assume for
a moment that government provisions for unemployment relief are not indexed to inflation
and thus encompass a nominal part. Then, if the nominal element is sufficiently large, the
general case would indeed allow an argument in favor of a “liberal” central bank in the sense
of Proposition 5. Or does it?
Careful consideration shows that the argument focusing on the government itself as
source of the nominal element in the trade union’s outside option is potentially inconsistent. A
crucial observation in this regard is that de facto the government will always determine a real
rather than a nominal outside option for the union, even when de jure unemployment benefits
are defined in nominal terms. This is because the government acts as Stackelberg leader vis-à-
vis the central bank. Therefore it implicitly determines the price level (or inflation) by setting
the degree of the central bank conservatism and hence also the level of real unemployment
benefits. As a consequence, from the viewpoint of the government, determining the trade
union’s real outside option directly (for instance, by setting  0 >
real b ,  0 =
nom b ) or indirectly
(for instance, by setting  0 =
real b ,  0 >
nom b  and taking into account the implied price level) is
perfectly equivalent with respect to the resulting real transfers to the unemployed. This is a
relevant result in its own right, since there will often be a constitutional requirement to
guarantee a minimum standard of living. What is more, however, is that – given such an
implicitly or explicitly defined level of unemployment benefits – the type of transfer has
important consequences for welfare.
While in equilibrium the real allocation of trade union members between employment
and unemployment will be the same for a given ex post level of real unemployment benefits,
inflation will be strictly higher when the trade union ex ante perceives its outside option as
being defined (mainly) in nominal terms. As shown above in Propositions 4b and 5, when
unemployment benefits are defined strictly in nominal terms or when the nominal element in
a benefit system is large enough, the government will opt to decrease c
* to moderate the trade
union’s wage demands. As discussed, the effect works through the resulting “liberal”
monetary policy stance. However, such a “liberal” central bank policy will also increase
inflation compared to a scenario in which the trade union’s outside option is defined in real
terms ex ante. As already discussed in Propositions 4a and 5, the government will decide to16
nominate a “conservative” central bank if unemployment benefits are (predominantly) real.
The reason is that in this scenario, the trade union lacks a sufficiently strong incentive to
moderate its wage claims and only a strong anti-inflationary monetary policy can achieve
price stability. As a consequence, if the government itself is the source of a possibly nominal
outside option for the trade union, welfare maximization would imply that is chooses
unemployment benefits to be in strictly real terms only.
An illustrative example is the case when we acknowledge that, perhaps for social
reasons, the government pledges to secure a certain minimum real living standard, say
b p b
nom = / > 0.
6 Since then








such a policy would effectively reintroduce a real outside option for the trade union. With a
real outside option set at its minimum, the trade union will decide to set its wage rate such
that employment is maximized relative to a scenario in which the government would allow
the outside option of the trade union to contain nominal elements. As Proposition 2 shows,
setting  +¥ ﬁ c  will, in addition, achieve zero inflation. Using its two instruments to tackle
its two policy targets, zero inflation and minimum unemployment, the government can
unambiguously improve welfare compared to the initial equilibrium with (b
nom > 0,  +¥ < c ).
A consequence of this thought experiment is that the use of both policy instruments will
reintroduce the Rogoff solution even to the single monopoly trade union case with a de jure
nominal outside option. Consequently, setting  +¥ ﬁ c  would be the government’s preferred
choice. A similar reasoning would apply if the monopoly trade union’s outside option would
be forgone real income in the shadow economy. Proposition 6 summarizes these results:
Proposition 6 (government and outside option): If the nominal outside option
of the monopoly trade union can be set by the government but there is a real floor
(a social minimum) limiting the choice of the nominal outside option, the
government will choose the minimum real option and resurrect the conservative-
central-bank solution ( +¥ ﬁ c ).
                                                
6 Alternatively, we could argue that the government might not be able to commit itself to a zero level of nominal
unemployment benefits in a time-consistent way. Then  b  might be the real outcome of the underlying political
economic equilibrium.17
6. Conclusion
Rogoff’s (1985) conservative central banker, an important point of reference for economists
thinking about institutional remedies against inflation, has come under attack lately. A series
of influential papers has questioned the very core of the Rogoff argument, that is, whether
making the central bank more conservative than society will indeed help to reduce inflation at
no real cost. The standard monetary policy model supports this view, simply because a more
inflation-averse central bank will be less tempted to trade off higher inflation for (short-term
only) gains in output and employment. Lower unemployment is a worthwhile policy target in
the standard model because rigidities such as trade union market power render equilibrium
employment too low. A major drawback of this argument is, however, that this incentive is
introduced as an exogenous assumption rather than an outcome of, for instance, monopolistic
trade union behavior.
Explicitly modeling the behavior of a monopoly trade union and its interaction with
monetary policy, Cukierman and Lippi (1999) and Guzzo and Velaso (1999) have argued that
a conservative central bank might actually be welfare reducing. The reason is that, if a
conservative central bank keeps prices in check even when nominal wages rise, the trade
union will not have to suffer the same inflationary consequences as with a less conservative
monetary policy. Because more aggressive wage demands will also drive up real wages, an
important consequence of this interaction between the central bank and the trade union is that
now monetary policy also has real effects. The more conservative the central bank, the less
moderate wage claims are and the higher unemployment is. As a result, an “ultra-liberal”
rather than a Rogoff-type central bank will maximize welfare in such a model.
So, is the institutional remedy for inflation suggested by Rogoff (1985) erroneous in
the presence of strong labor unions? Our answer is no. The present paper shows that the
“ultra-liberal” central bank result is based on a specific assumption about the nature of the
monopoly trade union’s outside option. In fact, it is only if the outside option of the trade
union is defined in strictly nominal terms that the case against the conservative central bank
can be made. Only then will the threat that wage-induced price increases pose to unemployed
trade union members effectively moderate trade union wage demands. If, however, the
outside option of the trade union is defined in real terms, trade union behavior and monetary
policy are no longer interconnected. In this case, the incentive to trade off inflation against
employment is again exogenous from the perspective of monetary policy makers – central
bank characteristics no longer matter for trade union behavior. Consequently, there is no
welfare gain associated with making the central bank less conservative than society – quite to18
the contrary. An important question raised by this dichotomy is which scenario is more
likely?
Consider the possible sources of a nominal outside option for trade union members,
i.e. the assumption that lies at the heart of the “liberal” central bank result. Probably the most
likely reason for the existence of a nominal outside option is the government itself. While
perhaps not a particularly plausible assumption, it might be argued that unemployment
benefits are sometimes specified in strictly nominal terms. Other important outside options for
trade union members, for instance, leisure or black market activities, are almost exclusively
defined in real terms. But, is the government actually free to leave the real benefits of
unemployed trade union members in the hands of the central bank and the trade union? Most
likely there will be an explicit or implicit guarantee of a minimum real standard of living.
Such a real floor to the government-provided outside option has important consequences.
As we argue in the paper, if the government is to guarantee a certain ex post real
outside option for the unemployed, it is always better of by announcing ex ante that, for
instance, unemployment benefits are defined in real terms. The reason is that, while the ex
post real wage and thus employment would be similar both under real and nominal outside
options, inflation would be higher in the latter case. This is because with a nominal outside
option, the government would choose a more “liberal” central bank to run monetary policy in
order to moderate trade union wage claims. This will raise inflation above the level that would
prevail with the same (ex post) real outside option pre-specified ex ante. In other words, a
government that values employment and stable prices is always better off fixing the level of
unemployment benefits and social transfers in real terms ex ante and, at the same time,
choosing a conservative, Rogoff-type central banker. Once both instruments of government
policy are taken into account, the standard solution is resurrected.
A key insight given by the above discussion is that important institutions governing
labor market performance and inflation are not independent, but rather are connected by the
interaction of monetary policy and trade union behavior. The present paper has shown that
economic policy might combine fiscal measures and institutional design to achieve a desired
outcome in the presence of trade union monopoly power. Future research should find it
interesting to combine this line of thought with earlier work, for instance by  Agell and
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The inequality shown follows from the first-order condition (17). Applying the first-order
condition of the central bank (4) we can show that:
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The first order condition can thus be rewritten as
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From this it follows that
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It is shown that Proposition 5 also holds for the more general case where the trade union
has to consider both a real and a nominal outside option:















The first-order condition is given by:
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or, by following the steps for 
nom b  above;
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where we have defined  ] ) 1 2 /[( ] ) 1 [( n p n p Z - + - ” . Note that the second part of (A-4)
consists simply of the sum of the changes in the outside option in the two special cases
of b
nom = 0 and b
real = 0 for a marginal increase in w. In the latter case this is obvious
from a comparison with (A-1). In the former case just multiply (15) through by





ww b p b V Z d + d + d - - = 1 ,
where the second and third term can be interpreted in a similar fashion as (A-5) above
as the sum of the second derivatives of the outside option at the extremes b
nom = 0 and
b
real = 0. As  0 < ww V  must hold if it is optimal for the trade union to raise the wage rate
above the outside option, we can again concentrate on the sign of  wc V  at  0 = w V .
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with  0 > c Z . Using the first-order condition for  0 = w V , (A-3), we can solve for










c b p b
b p b
w





Substituting in the first-order condition yields21
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Defining  0 < d + d - ” A w p b p b w
real real  since  q < 1 and  0 < Z d + Z d - ” B w b b w
nom nom 7,
we can split (A-7) in the following way:
) ( ) ( B + A
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Rearranging the first term yields:
(A-8)
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( B + A
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￿


















As  0 < c p , the sign of the first term is negative, but the second is positive as  0 > Zc
and  0 B < . Thus, as was to be expected, the influence of the nominal and real outside
options determine the reaction of wages to an increase in c. If the absolute size of the
first term is smaller than that of the second, an increase in  c  leads to higher wage
demands. This result shows that the change in nominal wage can go either way.






















































































Z d + Z d -
Z d -
=
As  0 < c p ,  0 < B , and  0 < B + A  the sign of the second term is positive. The first term is also
positive as  0 > Zc . Hence, if the nominal outside option is positive, the real wage always
increases in the degree of central bank conservatism.
                                                
7 B < 0 if  ) 1 )( 1 ( - d - > p n . Otherwise, the second-order condition is not fulfilled for the case with the trade
union facing a nominal outside option only.22
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